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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH BANK & TRUST, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Resporulent 
vs. 
JAMES H. QUINN and 
JAMES H. QUINN, Jr., 
Def erulants-.A. ppellants 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF-
Case No. 
16788 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff against defendants seeking to re-
cover a deficiency judgment after disposition of collateral. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Court entered judgment for the plaintiff based upon the 
verdict of the Jury granting plaintiff a deficiency judgment in the 
sum of $148,387.61 plus costs and attorney fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Decision affirming lower court judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants are the Defendants, Dr. James H. Quinn and 
his son, James H. Quinn, Jr. (Jay Quinn) The respondent is the 
Plaintiff, Utah Bank & Trust. 
Jay Quinn was the President of Alpine-Rennsport, a car dealer-
ship in Salt Lake City. The plaintiff provided financing for much 
of the inventory of the company on a trust receipt basis. Dr. Quinn 
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signed a Continuing Guaranty in favor of the plaintiff to guarantee 
the obligations of the company. 
It is worthy to report in this sequence two seemingly unrelated 
matters that become material at a later time: 
-The first is that Plaintiff had previously granted unto Jay Quinn 
a personal loan of $8,500.00. (Tr. 19) 
-The second incident occurred in May 1977 wherein Jay Quinn 
came into the bank and requested that the bank wire the 
sum of $41,400.00 to an eastern location. The check that 
Quinn used in paying for the wire which was drawn on 
another bank, was not honored and was never paid. (Tr. 
19, 20) 
In December 1977, the corporation sold some of the cars out of 
trust in that they, upon receiving the sales price from various cars, 
failed to pay any of the proceeds to the bank. (Tr. 13, 219) The 
amount that was sold out of trust was in the sum of $57 ,500.00. 
(Tr. 220) 
On December 17, 1977, Mr. George Cook, Branch Manager of 
plaintiff, after notifying Jay Quinn and others, repossessed the car 
inventory of the corporation-which consisted of thirteen cars. A 
boat was also repossessed. (Tr. 12, 22) Two of the cars were re-
turned to Jay Quinn so that he could trade them in on a car for his 
personal use. (Tr.. 22) 
On December 23, 1977, Cook and Mr. M. H. Atwood, Executive 
Vice-President of the plaintiff, met with Jay Quinn and Dr. Quinn 
to discuss the matter. At this time the following pertinent events 
occurred: 
-The Defendants signed a Promissory Note in the amount of $198,-
240.00 payable April 21, 1978. (Tr. 18, 19) The amount 
of the note was based upon the following: 
$ 41,400.00 
8,500.00 
Dishonored check given to bank 
to pay for a bank wire. (Tr. 19, 
20) 
Personalloan (Tr. 19) 
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57,500.00 
90,840.00 
$198,240.00 
8 
Amount sold out of trust. (Tr. 
220) 
Remaining amount of flooring 
obligation. 
-All present discussed the matter of disposition of the automobiles 
and boat. Jay Quinn indicated that he had a number of 
friends that were car dealers and he preferred that the 
cars be placed with one or more of them for sale. (Tr. 22, 
86) It was mutually decided that the automobiles be sold 
through local car dealers. 
-Jay Quinn pledged his interest in a house, by way of an Assign-
ment of Real Estate Contract, as security for the note. 
-There was a discussion and understanding among the parties that 
there would be a deficiency even after applying the sales 
proceeds of the collateral. There was some mention by 
Dr. Quinn that he would sell some property in Texas to 
cover the remaining deficiency. (Tr. 86) 
Shortly after the December 23, 1977, meeting the parties under-
took to sell the cars and the boat. With respect to the efforts to do 
so, these pertinent events transpired: 
-A few days after the December 23 meeting, Jay Quinn called 
George Cook and informed him that he had made arrange-
ments with Dewey Wood Motors to display and sell some 
of the cars on their lot. (Tr. 22) Accordingly, seven of 
the eleven cars were moved to the Dewey Wood Motors' 
lot. One car was sold. (Tr. 23) 
-The cars were thereafter moved to other lots in order to obtain bet-
ter prices. (Tr. 24) 
-Jay Quinn left for Arizona shortly after December 23 and was 
there until approximately January 2, 1978. He was in 
Arizona during some of January 1978 and moved to Ari-
zona finally in February 1978. (Tr. 198) 
-There were a number of expenditures for repairs of the cars to 
make them ready for sale. The cars were all used and in 
less than top condition. (Tr. 68-7 4) 
-At the time the boat was picked up it was reported by Jay Quinn 
that it had been winterized. (Tr. 35) Jay Quinn's man-
ager also verified that Jay Quinn reported to him that 
the boat was prepared for winter. (Tr. 211) 
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-At the time the boat was being prepared for sale, it was noticed 
that there was a cracked block. 
-The boat was advertised for sale in the newspaper on three differ-
ent occasions and by word of mouth. (Tr. 33) Plaintiff 
received many phone calls and much interest was shown 
concerning the boat. The boat was sold on March 26, 
1979, for $3,000.00 as is; which was based upon the high-
est off er given. · 
-By way of recapitulation the cars were sold as follows: 
Automobile Dealer 
Date (1978) Description Location of Sale Amount 
Jan. 19 1975 Ford Granada Dewey Wood Motors $ 1,500.00 
Feb. 17 1973 Jaguar Aagaard Motors 8,500.00 
Mar. 13 1973 Porshe Ride-a-Way Motors 7,600.00 
Mar. 21 197 5 Ferrari Aagaard Motors 13,500.00 
Mar. 21 1974 Audi Ride-a-Way Motors 2,500.00 
Mar. 21 1975 Porshe Aagaard Motors 11,500.00 
Apr. 25 1975 Alfa Romeo Aagaard Motors 4,500.00 
May 5 1973 Porshe Aagaard Motors 7,100.00 
June 20 197 5 Toyota P /U R. Kingsland* 2,600.00 
June 27 1973 BMW Aagaard Motors 2,500.00 
July 13 1973 BMW Aagaard Motors 3,000.00 
*R. Kingsland was not a car dealer but an individual who purchased 
the car after reading an ad in the newspaper. 
-Jay Quinn acquired a buyer for the house which was pledged as 
security, and the house was sold on March 27, 1978. The 
net equity realized from the sale of the house was in the 
amount of $23,854.60 which was applied to the reduction 
of the note. (Tr. 37, Ex. 17-P) 
-After applying the proceeds from the sale of all of the cars, the 
boat, and the house to the promissory note and adding 
appropriate interest, the balance due as of September 5, 
1979, was in the amount of $148,387.61. (Tr. 41, Ex. 
17-P) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE 
OF THE SALE OF THE COLLATERAL DOES NOT PRE-
CLUDE THE PLAINTIFF FROM OBTAINING A DE-
FICIENCY JUDGMENT. 
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At trial the court held as a matter of law that the Plaintiff did 
not give Defendants written notice of the sale of the collateral. As 
previously indicated, the collateral was repossessed on December 17, 
1977. On December 23, 1977, both of the defendants met with rep-
resentatives of the bank during which time a discussion was held 
concerning disposition of the collateral. It was suggested by Jay 
Quinn, and there was a consensus among the parties, that the auto-
mobiles should be sold by display on used car lots. Seven of the auto-
mobiles were originally displayed on the Dewey Wood's car lot at 
the initial suggestion of Jay Quinn. All but one of the automobiles 
were sold on used car lots after display. 
The jury found as fact by way of special verdicts the following: 
PROPOSITION NO. 1 
Was the disposition of the collateral by Utah Bank & Trust 
made in a commercially reasonable manner? Yes. 
PROPOSITION NO. 3 
The court has instructed you that the plaintiff failed to give 
written notice to the defendants of the proposed sale of the col-
lateral. Please answer the following: What loss, if any, was 
caused to the defendants by the failure to give notice of the sale 
of the collateral? 
Amount: None. 
Statutory references applicable to this case are from the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Title 70 A, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended: 
70 A-1-106. Remedies to be Liberally Administered. 
( 1 ) The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally 
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in 
as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but 
neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had 
except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of 
law. (Emphasis added) 
70 A.-9-501. Default 
( 3) To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and 
impose liabilities on the secured party, the rule stated in the sub-
sections referred to below may not be waived or varied except 
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as provided with respect to compulsory disposition of collateral 
(subsections (I) of Section 70 A-9-505) and with respect to re-
demption of collateral (Sections 70 A-905 ( 6) but the parties 
may by agreement determine the standards by which the fulfill-
ment of these rights amd duties is to be measured if such stand-
ards are not manifestly unreasonable. (Emphasis added) 
70.A.-9-504. Secured Parties Right to Dispose of Collateral 
.A.fter Default-Effective Disposition 
( 2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the 
secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, 
unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. 
( 3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private 
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. 
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at 
any time and place and on any terms, but every aspect of the 
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms 
must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable 
or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type custo-
marily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of 
the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification 
of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposi-
tion is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, 
if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modi-
fying his right to notification of sale . . . 
70.A.-9-507. Secured Parties Liability for Failure to Comply 
With This Part. 
(I) If it is established that the secured party is not pro-
ceeding in accordance with the provisions of this party, disposi-
tion may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and con-
ditions. If the disposition has occurred, the debtor or any person 
entitled to notification or whose security interest has been made 
known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right 
to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure 
to comply with the provisions of this part . . . 
( 2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained 
by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that 
selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish 
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable man-
ner. If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual 
manner in any recognized market therefor, or if he sells at the 
price current in such market at the time of the sale, or if he has 
otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial prac-
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tices among dealers in type of property sold he has sold in a 
commercially manner ... 
In dealing with the question of whether a creditor is entitled 
to a deficiency judgment after having sold the collateral without 
notice to the debtor there is a split of authority. 
Some jurisdictions hold that failure to give notice to the debtor 
of the sale of the collateral constitutes an absolute bar to a deficiency 
judgment. The state jurisdictions that have so held are California, 
Florida, Georgia, Maine, Nebraska. There are cases that have also 
held in Iowa, Illinois, and New York. However, in these last three 
jurisdictions there are also other cases that have allowed a deficiency 
judgment. 
In an analysis of the cases of these jurisdictions that do not al-
low a deficiency judgment the fallowing reasons have been given: 
(I) Solution to the question is found in Pre-Code Law where under 
comparable circumstances a deficiency judgment was denied. See 
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. 
Pa. 1963) . ( 2) Several state statutes contain provisions denying de-
ficiency judgments when notice of the resale is not given: See: 
White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer In Repossession, 
Resales, and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3 UCC L. J. 224. (3) De-
ficiency judgments have not been allowed where the secured trans-
actions is in the form of an installment sale contract, particularly 
where the contract did not provide for a deficiency judgment. 
Other jurisdictions permit a recovery of a deficiency judgment 
even though notice is not given by the creditor to the debtor of the 
disposition of the collateral. The fallowing jurisdictions have so held: 
Alaska: 
Arkansas: 
Colorado: 
Kobuk Engineering and Contract Services, Inc., v. 
Superior Tank & Construction Co.-Alaska Inc., 
22 UCC Reporting Service 854 
Universal CIT Credit Company v. Rone, 453 
s.w. 2d 37, (1970) 
Community Management Assoc. of Colo. Springs 
v. Tousley ( 1973) 11 UCC Reporting Service 1101 
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Conn.: 
Del.: 
Kansas: 
Illinois: 
Indiana: 
Iowa: 
Nevada: 
N. Mex.: 
N. Y.: 
Wash.: 
8 
Savings Bank of New Britian v. Booze, ( 1977) 
23 UCC Reporting Service 556 
Ruston v. Shea (1976) 22 UCC Reporting Service 
274 
Barbour v. United States 22 UCC Reporting Serv-
ice 850 
Tauber v. Johnson (1972) 22 N. E. 2d 180 
Hall v. Owen State Bank (197J) 23 UCC Re-
porting Service 267 
Beneficial Financing Company of Black Hawk 
County v. Reed (1973), 212 N.W. 2d 454 
Levers v. Real King Land & Investment Co. 
(1977) 21 UCC Reporting Service 344 
Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forrest 
Products, Inc. (1975) 87 N.M. 451, 535 P. 2d 
1077 
Security Trust Company of Rochester v. Thomas 
(1977) 22 UCC Reporting Service 1305 
Merchants Leasing Company v. Clark (1975) 14 
Wash. app. 317 
From the jurisdictions allowing a deficiency judgment as noted 
above, there has emerged a number of distinct positions regarding 
the effect of a failure to notify. Some courts suggest that Section 
9-507 of the Uniform Commercial Code (supra.) which provides 
that the debtor has the right to recover from the secw·ed party any 
loss occasioned by a failure to comply with the provisions relating 
to the disposition of collateral is a sole, sufficient and adequate 
remedy. In The Merchants Leasing Co. v. Clark 14 Wash. App. 
317, 540 P. 2d 922 (1975) the court held that the creditor did not 
lose his right to a deficiency judgment against the debtor by selling 
the repossessed equipment without giving notice, but the debtor 
would be entitled to have any damages caused to them by such lack 
of notice credited gainst the deficiency judgment. 
There are other jurisdictions that hold that a denial of the de-
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ficiency judgment deprives the secured party to be put in as good 
a position as if the other party had fully performed. See: 409 Ore. L. 
Rev. 65, 69 ( 1969). 
Still other jurisdictions, such as Arkansas, announce the rule 
that failure to give notice does not result in a bar to a deficiency 
judgment but creates a presumption that the collateral was worth 
at least the amount of the debt-that the burden is then placed on the 
secured party to prove what would have been realized from a com-
mercially reasonable sale. If the secured party is unable to overcome 
the presumption, he recovers no deficiency. If the presumption is re-
butted by the secured party proving the amount which would have 
been realized from a commercially reasonable sale, such amount forms 
the basis for computing the deficiency which the secured party will 
be allowed. See Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240, Ark. 
143, 398 s.w. 2d 538 (1966). 
The no deficiency rule has been criticized by a number of law 
review articles. In Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, 1973 
p. 47 4 it is stated: 
The Code must function on the theory that the overwhelming 
number of commercial transactions are executed in good 
faith, and this assumption is most likely accurate. In those 
relatively few instances in which the secured party, for what 
ever reason, has failed to comply with section 9-504 ( 3) 
notice requirements, it is better to adopt a flexible standard 
which would allow the secured party to be made whole and 
yet which would protect the debtor on a case-by-case basis. 
This protection is already afforded by 9-507: Such protec-
tion does not require an additional judicially created pen-
alty denying the secured party's right to a deficiency judg-
ment. 
In _University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 44, 1972, p. 230 
it is stated: 
The absolute defense approach produces a result which goes 
beyond compensating the debtor for his loss and thus seems 
to penalize the creditor. The debtor is relieved of the defi-
ciency under this approach without even showing the loss. 
This would seem inconsistent with the Code's policy against 
punitive damages since it may place the debtor in a better 
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position than he would have been had the creditor met the 
requirements, all at the creditor's expense. 
In Utah Law Review, Vol. 3, 1979 at p. 580 it is stated: 
From the debtor's standpoint an automatic denial of a de-
ficiency judgment for failure to notify is preferable to pro-
ducing evidence of what would have happened had he been 
notified or to proving the damage sustained through 
being denied the right to redeem. This recogniton merely 
exposes the major shortcoming of the no deficiency rule. 
It creates a great potential for giving the debtor an unde-
served remedy, thereby imposing a penalty on the secured 
party, and undermining the U.C.C.'s announced policy 
against windfalls and penalties. The realization that the no 
deficiency rule applies indiscriminately to even inadvertant 
or accidental omissions to notify only magnified the inade-
quacy of that position. 
This jurisdiction has decided a number of cases in which the 
matter of giving notice to the debtor was at issue. In Zion's First Na-
tional Bank v. Hurst, 570 P. 2d 1031 (Utah 1977) the secured 
creditor, Zion's First National Bank, sued the defendant to recover 
$50,000.00, the amount of a Guaranty Agreement which the def end-
ant had executed. The plaintiff's loan was secured by collateral 
which included five airplanes. The airplanes were sold and realized 
the sum of $72,500.00, which was applied to the total debt of $250,-
893.20, leaving a deficiency of $178,393.00. The extent of the de-
fendant's guarantee was in the amount of $50,000.00. On appeal the 
defendant alleged that the plaintiff did not notify him of the time 
and place of the sale of the five airplanes and thus urged that the 
plaintiff should be precluded from obtaining any deficiency judg-
ment against him. Although the matter of notice was not raised in 
the pleadings, the court stated in disposing of this issue : 
More importantly, the usual rule is that failure to so notify 
does not release the debtor from any deficiencies that may 
arise: but upon such failure he may get credit for (or re-
cover) only for any loss caused by the failure to so notify. 
In that connection, inasmuch as the airplanes sold for $72,-
500.00, they would have to have brought nearly three times 
that amount, that is $200,000.00 or more, before the pro-
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ceeds therefrom would have relieved the defendant from any 
liability under his Guaranty. 
In Cessna Finance Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P. 2d 1048, (Utah 1978) 
the creditor brought an action against the guarantors to recover a 
deficiency following repossession of the collateral. The debtor claimed 
that the notice of the sale of the collateral was insufficient. The court 
held that it was and stated: 
An earlier case, Zion's v. Hurst, is dispositive of some of 
the issues in this case . . . . This court held that Hurst had 
not been damaged or prejudiced by the sale and cited the 
general rule that a failure to notify does not release the 
debtor-it merely affords him credit for any loss caused by 
the failure to notify. This common law has been codified in 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
The court then cited Section 70 A-9-507. 
In FM.A. Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers et. al., 590 P. 
2d 803, ( Utah-1979) the secured creditor asked for a deficiency 
judgment in the amount of $21,97 5.96. The secured creditor repos-
sessed some equipment and appraised the equipment at $10,250.00 
on its repossession report. Four months earlier an appraiser in be-
half of the debtor appraised the equipment. between $15,000.00 and 
$17,000.00. The equipment was stored in a garage for eight months 
and finally purchased by a third party for $4,500.00. The court held 
that the secured creditor did not give notice of the sale and did not 
dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner and 
stated: 
Because FMA did not give the required notice and did not 
conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner, it is 
barred from receiving a deficiency judgment. (Emphasis 
added) 
What do the Utah cases say? It has been noted that the Utah rule 
has not been fully ennunciated. See Utah Law Review, Vol. 3 (1979) 
page .567. The Cessna case, supra., and the Zion's case, supra, hold 
that failure to notify the debtor of the sale of the collateral does not 
release the debtor from any deficiency that may arise, but upon such 
failure, the debtor may receive credit for any loss occasioned by the 
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failure to give notice. The FMA case, supra, holds, at least on those 
particular facts, where the secured creditor did not give notice and 
did not dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable man-
ner, they are not entitled to a deficiency. 
To hold that f allure to give notice constitutes an absolute bar in 
every fact situation creates windfalls, forefeitures and penalties. By 
way of a hypothetical to illustrate, assume that a loaning institution 
grants a loan to a debtor in the sum of $100,000.00. The debtor had 
a substantial net worth. The bank did not require full security but 
did take a security agreement wherein $10,000.00 worth of collateral 
was pledged. 
The debtor defaults, and the creditor repossesses the collateral, 
but neglects to give notice of the sale of the collateral. The collateral 
is disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. The creditor 
thereupon has a deficiency in the amount of $90,000.00. To bar a 
deficiency judgment in this hypothetical case for failure to give 
notice would be a windfall to the debtor and would constitute a for-
feiture and penalty-all contrary to the spirit of the UCC. 
The facts in the present case are similar. Defendants signed a 
promissory note in the amount of $198,240.00. This amount included 
a dishonored check in the amount of $41,400.00 and a personal loan 
in the amount of $8,500.00. The amount also represented $57,500.00 
sold out of trust. There was a discussion and understanding among 
the parties that there would be a deficiency even after applying the 
sales proceeds of all of the collateral. There was some mention by 
Dr. Quinn that he would sell some property in Texas to cover the re-
maining deficiency-which was never done. 
As to the disposition of the collateral, the jury found that the 
collateral was disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner, and 
the facts are more than sufficient to show that the collateral was 
disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. 
In American State Insurance Co. v. Miller, Adams and Craw-
ford, 557 P. 2d 756 (Utah 1976) sureties obtained a deficiency judg-
ment against defendants who were parties to a construction bond. 
The judgment was obtained by default, but the defendants later on 
made a motion to compel satisfaction of the default judgment on 
the basis that the surety failed to notify the defendants of the sale of 
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certain collateral that was pledged as security for the surety bond. 
The motion was denied. Justice Crockett, in a concurring opinion 
stated: 
It is undoubtedly true that the requirement of Section 
7 A-9-504 (3) tha"t the secured creditor (plaintiff) give the 
debtor (defendants) notice of sale of the collateral is to af-
ford the debtor an opportunity to see that a fair price is paid 
therefor and that he get adequate credit on his debt. 
It strikes me as unrealistic and unfair to rule that, re-
gardless of actual value, the sale of the pledged property 
is worth only a small fraction of the judgment and thus the 
plaintiff would be cheated out of the remainder of his debt. 
On the other hand, to permit the creditor to sell the pledged 
property without notice may result in its being sold for 
much less than its fair value and thus deprive the debtor of 
credit he is entitled to. 
It is my view that the court should not apply any un-
varying and rigid rule, but should examine the total situa-
tion and determine what is fair and reasonable. Justice re-
quires the rule to be that if the sale of the collateral is not 
conducted according to the requirements of the statute, that 
should neither automatically and conclusively bar the plain-
tiff from claiming payment of the rest of the judgment, nor 
should the amount received at the sale be regarded as con-
clusive evidence that the fair value of the property was re-
ceived, and thus determine the amount which the defense 
are entitled to as credit on the judgment. 
POINT II 
FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE REQUIRED BY SECTION 
70A-9-504 DOES NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW MAKE 
THE SALE OF, COLLATERAL COMMERCIALLY UN-
REASON ABLE. 
Appellants urge in their brief that since the Respondent did not 
give written notice to Appellants of the sale of the collateral, that 
the sale, therefore, was not made in a commercially reasonable man-
ner. 
This is not so and is not in accordance with the law. Section 
70A-9-504 ( 3) provides: 
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( 3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private pro-
ceedings and made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or 
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time 
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposUion in-
cluding the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable. (Emphasis added) 
Section 70A-9-507 ( 2) provides: 
( 2) . . . . If the secured party either sells the collateral in the 
usual manner in any resognized market therefor or if he sells at 
the price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he luis 
otherwise sold in conformity with reasonahle commercial prac-
tices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a 
commercially reasonable manner. The principles stated in the 
two preceeding sentences with respect to sales also apply as may 
be appropriate to other types of disposition. (Emphasis added) 
The foregoing strongly and clearly indicates that the require-
ment of notice to the debtor is separate and apart from the require-
ments of disposition of collateral in a commercially reasonable man-
ner. In North Carolina National Bank v. Burnette, 247 S.E. 2d 648, 
(N.C. 1978) the court held that the notice that is required to be 
given regarding the sale of collateral is separate and distinct from 
the requirement of commercial reasonableness. 
Apparentsly the Utah court also recognizes that the notice re-
quirement and the requirements of commercial reasonableness are 
distinct and separate. In the FM.A case, supra, the court stated: 
Because FMA did not give the required notice and did not con-
duct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner, it is barred 
from receiving a deficiency judgment. (Emphasis added) 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7 RE-
LATING TO THE ELEMENTS OF A COMMERCIALLY 
REASON ABLE SALE. 
Appellants further urge that the Court erred in failing to give 
Appellants' requested jury instruction No. 7. The court did give the 
fallowing instructions relating to commercially reasonableness: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceed-
ings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale 
or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time 
and place and on terms but every aspect of the disposition in-
cluding the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable . . . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale 
at a different time or in a different method from that selected 
by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that 
the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If 
the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in 
any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price cur-
rent in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise 
sold in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among 
dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a commercial-
ly reasonable manner. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
While the requirement that the collateral must be disposed of in 
a commercially reasonable manner may not be waived. Utah 
State law provides that the parties may by agreement determine 
the standards by which the fulfillment of this requirement is to be 
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 
The foregoing instructions comport with the statutory provisiions 
relating to commercial reasonableness and include the basic elements 
of that principle. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE AP-
PELLANT DISPOSED OF THE COLLATERAL IN A 
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER. 
There is more than adequate evidence that the Appellant dis-
posed of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. When 
the collateral was repossessed there was a joint discussion and agree-
ment between the parties that the collateral should be sold and that 
the cars should be displayed on car dealer lots. (Tr. 22, 86) The 
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automobiles were displayed on various lots and sold for the highest 
available prices. (Tr. 52, 67, 73) One of the vehicles was sold to a 
private party after advertising in the newspaper. (Tr. 28) Prior to 
the respective sales some of the automobiles (as were needed) were 
repaired. (Tr. 30, 69, 70, 71) The Appellant and the various car 
dealers which were displaying the automobiles for sale, advertised in 
local papers. (Tr. 28, 29) The prices realized from the sale of the 
automobiles were fair and reasonable. (Tr. 73) 
Appellants suggest that since the Respondent did not advertize 
in trade journals such as Road & Track and Auto Week, that the 
cars were not sold in a commercially reasonable manner. But, it is 
worthy to note that Appellants' own expert witness, Ray Pellum, 
i 
stated: that he sold for Bavarian Motors who deal solely with Euro-
pean, sports and exotic cars; and that their sales of fices are located 
in Salt Lake City; and further-
Q. And isn't it true, that the majority of their sales are to peo-
ple within the Utah area? 
A. That's right. (Tr. 130) 
An expert called by Appellant, Randall Aagaard, (who inci-
dentally sold some of the cars for Appellant) testified on cross exam-
ination: (Tr. 81) 
Q. Would it be fair to state that in order to reach the best mar-
ket for an exotic foreign car, the best place to advertise 
would be in Road and Track magazine or Auto Week? 
A. Well, I thought that, but I done quite a bit of advertising 
in both of them and never had any luck whatsoever in either 
publication. 
Q. You've never sold a car through either publication? 
A. No. 
The disposition of the collateral was disposed of consistant with 
70A-9-501 which provides: 
The parties may by agreement determine the standards by which 
the fulfillment of these rights and duties is to be measured if such 
standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 
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In Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank, 
570 P. 2d 702, (Wash. 1977) the secured ,creditor repossessed 
among other things, an automobile inventory and sold the same at a 
private sale. The court stated: 
Answering the additional contention of the debtor, we note that 
a private sale rather than a public sale was permissible. The col-
lateral disposed of consisted of new and used cars, trucks and 
campers. These items are customarily sold in a recognized market 
and are subject of widely distributed standard price quotations. 
. . . . We disagree with the assertion that the disposition was not 
commercially reasonable due to the failure to display and sell 
the vehicles as a retail dealer. Section 9-507, Official Comment .2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code states: 
One recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral 
is for the secured party to sell the collateral to or through 
a dealer-a method which in the long run may realize better 
average returns since the secured party does not usually 
maintain his own facilities for making such sales. Such 
method of sale, fairly conducted, is recognized as commer-
cially reasonable under the second sentence of sub-section 2 . 
. . . . The creditor was not engaged in retail automobile sales, 
and is not required to be so engaged to dispose of such collateral 
under RCW 62A 9-504 and 507. 
POINT V 
THERE WAS LEGAL CONSIDERATION GIVEN BY 
DR. QUINN FOR EXECUTION OF THE NEW NOTE. 
Appellants suggest that there was inadequate consideration 
given by Dr. Quinn for the new note. Initially Dr. Quinn signed a 
Continuing Guaranty in the amount of $180,000.00. After the re-
possession of the collateral a promissory note was prepared by the 
Respondent and signed by the Appellants representing the total 
amount due of $198,240.00. Appellants argue that this note is not 
supported by legal consideration. This point needs little argument 
as the long standing uniform rule is that a note given to pay a third 
person's debt is supported by valuable consideration. See 11 .Am Jur 
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2d, Bills and Notes, Sec. 227, Southern Frozen Foods v. Hill, 129 
SE 2d 420. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Respondents respectfully urge that judgment of 
the lower court in awarding Respondent a deficiency judgment be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of April, 1980. 
Layne B. Forbes 
A.ttorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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